668
471 process is not only time-consuming but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected.

B. High Taxation and Public Obligation

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668 The high taxes and many business restrictions imposed by the Communist regime are likewise unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, formulated at the end of 1953, is a measure to tax and to restrict the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products-- mainly rice and cotton-- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations.

668
653 Public obligations imposed upon the people are a further cause of public discontent.

668 The average peasant, for example, is required to
653 perform duties for the state periodically or on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. For one such project in Hopei, about 125,000 workers were drafted. The service of the militia has been necessary to force compliance on many occasions. Young peasants are required to perform military service whenever the state deems it necessary. City dwellers are not exempt from similar public service, being subject to patrol duty in their own and neighboring areas whenever needed.

668 Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not threat of rebellion. Depsite the Communists' attempts to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

668 1. Tension within Organizations. The
647 employment of various control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directives has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party, and mass organizations.

697 dard was fixed according to the skill and physical strength of the prisoners.

The policy of co-ordinating compulsory labor with political education was followed by the Shansi People's Court in carrying out the Reform-through-labor policy. After a period of political indoctrination, the prisoners accepted the control measures and met the production standard. For instance, the prisoners who dug coal in Taiyuan suburban area steadily increased the quantity of coal they were able to dig. By September 1951, the average amount of coal dug by each prisoner each day was nearly three-tenth of a ton. As of 1951, the Communists allege, the labor corps in Shansi Province were self-sufficient and, since 1952, have produced "surplus value" for the Chinese People's Government.[22]

697 212 The eradication of illiteracy has been a continuing process in Shansi provincial prisons, according to the Communists. As of March 1955, of the illiterate prisoners in the Shansi provincial jail, 71 per cent had acquired a knowledge of from 700 to 1,000 Chinese characters.[23]

## VI. MASS LABOR PROJECTS IN THE NORTH

653 ### A. Water Conservation

22. Cheng Chu-yüan, The Slavery System of the Chinese Communists, Hong Kong, 1952, p. 79.

23. NCNA, Peking, March 30, 1955; quoted in SCMP, No. 1020, p. 25.

653 The major water-conservation projects completed in North China by the Chinese Communists are Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on the Yung-ting River; the Ta-ch'ing River Diversion Channel; and the Fen River flood-control system.

Kuan-t'ing Reservoir. For many years, the Yung-ting River had been called "North China's Sorrow." Its flood manace is second only to that of the Yellow River ("China's Sorrow"). Seven major floods in a period of forty years had played havoc in Hopei Province. A plan for the control of the Yung-ting River, drafted by the Chihli River Commission before the Nationalist Party came into power, called for the building of a dam and reservoir at Kuan-t'ing Gorge where the Yung-ting River enters the Hopei Plain from the steep slope of the upper reaches; but nothing was done about it until October 1951.

A labor force of 50,000 peasants was mobilized to do the work.[24] The Kuan-t'ing Reservoir covers an area of 23,000 hectares (56,810 acres) and has a storage capacity of 2,370 million cubic meters (about 75,840 million cubic feet). The dam is 45 meters (147.6 feet) high and 290 meters (951 feet) long. The authorities built a small town on the construction site, fifty miles northewest of Peking, to accommodate the large body of labor. The peasants worked in shifts around the clock, in spite of the extremes of cold and heat typical of North China. In the period

24. Kuan-t'ing Shui-k'u [Kuan-t'ing Reservoir], Shanghai, 1954, p. 17.

653 from October 1951 to July 1953, the Communists gave public recognition to 2,000 workers and elected them "labor models."[25] The entire project was completed in May 1954.

According to the Communists, the completion of the Kuan-t'ing Reservoir would result in an annual saving of 50,000 tons of grain to the government. Fu Tso-yi, Minister of Water Conservation, in a speech delivered at the celebration of the completion of the Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on July 13, 1954, said, "It is a project which has turned the river from a scourge into a benefit for the people."[26]

Ta-ch'ing River Diversion Channel. The Ta-ch'ing River runs across Hopei Province. The Communist plan was to build a diversion channel 48 kilometers (about 30 miles) long to relieve the pressure of flood waters during the rainy season. More than 70,000 peasants were mobilized to begin work in March 1951, and the project was completed in July 1953. Fu Tso-yi attributed its successful completion to the energies of a heroic people who contributed their strength to aid their motherland.

The Fen River Flood-Control System. The Fen River in Shansi is a tributary in the

25. People's Daily, July 2, 1953, p. 1.
26. Ibid., May 15, 1954, p. 1.

653 middle section of the Yellow River and helps to irrigate an area of 280,000 square kilometers (about 106,600 square miles). Since 1949, the Communists have mobilized 200,000 peasants in this region to prevent floods and to reforest the area. As of August 1955, the Communists report that the peasants had built seven artifical lakes and planted 30,000,000 trees. The area of irrigated land[27] increased from 3,400,000 mou (513,400 acres) in 1952 to 5,000,000 mou (755,000 acres) in 1955, the Communists allege.

A fifty-year plan[28] to bring the Yellow River under control was announced in the second session of the National Congress of People's Representatives held in Peking in July 1955. If the Communists do carry out this project, mass labor on a vast scale will be needed for a long time to come.

B. Highway and Railway Construction

The new railways and new highways in Communist China have been constructed by forced labor to meet the needs of national defense. Apparently, their strategic value is at least as important as their economic significance. This is one of the reasons why almost all of the new railways and highways have been constructed in

27. Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, August 3, 1955, p. 3.

28. NCNA, Peking, July 11, 1955.

653 the Northwest and Southwest.

The only railway built in the North since the Communists seized power is the Feng-t'ai --Sha-ch'eng Line, a re-routing project begun in 1952 and completed in June 1955. The line is only about 65 miles long but it is the most difficult job in railway construction ever undertaken by the Communists. The laborers had to cut across some lofty and dangerous mountain ranges and build eight bridges across the twisting Yung-ting River. The line includes 65 large tunnels and 270 culverts and bridges.[29]

The recruited civilians began work under the direction of the Engineering Corps of the "Liberation Army" at the end of 1952. The regions through which the projected line was to pass proved inhospitable, and so the builders constructed a supply line during the severe winter months in order to get building materials and food from outside.

At the beginning of 1953, the construction of the most difficult tunnels began. At first the workers had no drilling machines, and the road builders used handnpicks to do the work. When it was seen that the completion date could not be met because of the primitive methods of construction, the Communist authorities recruited

29. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly] Peking, Aug. 1955, pp. 301 passim.

several hundred thousand civilians during 1953-54 to supplement the crew already at work. The recruits were requested to bring with them horses and wagons. Huai-lai hsien alone contributed 3,000 workers, and the farmers along the line were occasionally obliged to help. The line was opened to traffic in July 1955.

The Feng-t'ai -- Sha-ch'eng Line connects the Chi-ning -- Erh-lien and the Peking -- Pao-t'ou lines and facilitates transportation between Inner Mongolia and North China. It has strategic significance as well as economic importance.

## VII. CONCLUSION

Although the Chinese Communists have publicized their policy of Reform-through-labor, there are few trustworthy statistics available to allow for a systematic study.

In the case of Ch'ing-ho Farm, all of the reports cited came through the New China News Agency, and there is no reason to believe these reports are reliable. Raja Hutheesing, an Indian visitor who traveled through Red China on behalf of the India-China Friendship Associ[illegible] 30 in September 1951 and had read a New China News Agency report on the ideal conditions at Ch'ing-ho Farm, asked to see the farm itself, but his

30. Raja Hutheesing, The Great Peace, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1953, pp. 184-95.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 . AF 12 North China AF 12



commission of 13 cents per tael, the equivalent of the maximum charge sometimes levied on tax payments to compensate for the taxpayer using poor quality silver when paying his tax bill. The area of the Manchu land involved was 5,584 mu.

In 1927 this Manchu land was classified and offered for sale to private owners. It was entered on the tax roll with an average tax rate of 2.937 tael cents per mu.

A head tax was part of the Ming tax program. The families were divided into three different categories and there were three classes in each category. The lowest rate was 10 tael cents per head. The classification of the family and the size of the family were reviewed and adjusted every five years. In 1713 K'ang Hsi decreed that there should be no further revision of the size of the family and that all families should pay 10 cents per head. At that time the population of Ting Hsien was given as 88,111. This was a little more than one-fifth of the 1929 population figure, but if allowance is made for some under-reporting the total was probably about one quarter of the 1929 figure. The population apparently was doubling about once per century. At that rate the average population increase was 0.75 per cent per year.

Since revision of the number of persons in the family was prohibited by Imperial decree, it was not long before the tax base had but little relation to the actual number of persons in the family. There must have been many complaints over the inequity, for only 11 years later, in the second year of Yung Cheng, the head tax was discontinued and a compensating amount was added to the land tax.

A national labor draft was instituted by the Ming emperors to provide the workers needed to build their new palaces, first in Nanking and later in Peking. Quotas were set for the provinces and passed on to the hsien. Later the labor assessment was converted into a money payment. In 1724 the amount for Ting Hsien was only 33.75 taels. This too was added to the land tax.

The head tax and the labor assessment together totaled 8,097.507 taels, 20.7 per cent of the total basic land tax. The different land tax rates were all increased by that per cent. The resident o nei owners' rate became 15.927 tael cents per tax mu, equivalent to 4.55 tael cents per standard mu of good land, 2.28 cents for the poor land, and 1.14 for the very poor land. The o wei rates varied from 1.207 to 15.932 tael cents per mu with the average 2.282 cents per mu.